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ABSTRACT 
 
Organizations integrate information security measures through information security planning 
and policy development. This study aims to examine how the extent of collaborative exchange 
within the organization and extent of formalization of the information security function impact 
the effective utilization of well-established information security objectives. The security 
objectives of interest, described in general deterrence theory, are deterrence, detection and 
recovery. This study finds that organizations that exhibit higher levels of collaborative exchange 
and develop and implement more information security policies are more effectively utilizing the 
information security strategies of detection, deterrence and recovery. This study highlights the 
importance of the complementary nature of collaborative exchange and formalization within the 
information security discipline. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, in large part, information security is the implementation of controls and best practices 
suggested by consultants, standard governing bodies (i.e. National Institute of Standards & 
Technology) (NIST), International Organization for Standardization / International 
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), etc.), the organization’s information security 
department and, sometimes, the organization’s employees. While the use of global standards of 
practice, top management and the information security department within the organization to 
guide information security planning and implementations may be useful, existing research 
consistently shows a positive relationship exists between user involvement in planning and the 
effectiveness of the information systems function within organizations (Gottschalk, 1999; 
Sambamurthy et al., 1994; Segars & Grover, 1998). A deliverable of the information security 
planning process is the organization’s information security policies and procedures. Standard 
governing bodies (NIST, ISO/IEC) and researchers (Bidgoli, 2003; Garrison & Posey, 2006) 
stress the importance of creating information security policies and provide guidance on the 
different types of information security policies that an organization may need.  
 
This research attempts to examine the impact of end-user involvement and formalized 
information security policies on the effectiveness of the information security function within 
organizations. Specifically, this study focuses on two antecedent variables, collaborative 
exchange and formalization, and how it impacts the effective utilization of the information 
security strategies of deterrence, detection and recovery. Collaborative exchange is an 
assessment of the extent of collaboration between upper-level management, end users and the 
information security function. Formalization is an assessment of the extent of established formal 
information security policies within an organization.   
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The purpose of this research is twofold. First, this research aims to examine the individual effects 
of formalization and collaborative exchange on the effectiveness of information security 
detection, deterrence, and recovery activities. Much of the effort expended in the management of 
information security is in developing and enforcing information security policies. By examining 
formalization separately, the impact of information security policy development on effective 
utilization of information security strategies can be assessed. The second aim of this research is 
to examine the impact of collaborative exchange and formalization in concert on the 
effectiveness of information security detection, deterrence, and recovery activities. Evaluating 
complementary effect of collaborative exchange and formalization on effective utilization of 
information security strategies provides evidence supporting the importance of establishing 
information security policies with input and effort from all major constituencies within the 
organization.  
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature and practice. First, this research provides 
insight into how management choices in regards to establishing formal communication channels 
and developing information security policies may impact the effectiveness of the information 
security function. Second, the presence of the dependent variable, effectiveness of detection, 
deterrence and recovery activities, gives academics and practitioners a success measure which 
can guide more effective decision making in the information security domain.  
 
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
literature supporting the constructs of interest in this study. The following two sections will 
present the methodological approach taken in this study and the results of data collection. The 
next section will present the efforts in data analysis. The last section will present a discussion of 
the important findings and limitations of this research.  
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT 
 
Collaborative exchange and formalization 
  
Top management support and involvement has been identified as a significant factor impacting 
the success, or lack thereof, of IT projects and investments (Byrd et al., 1995; Hartono et al., 
2003; Jitpaiboon & Kalaian, 2005; Lederer & Salmela, 1996; Premkumar & King, 1994; 
Sasidharan et al., 2006). There is no such thing as perfect security. As a result, every 
organization must identify the value of the information assets within the organization and 
determine an acceptable level risk. Not all information assets in the organization are equal and, 
as such, determining acceptable levels of security expenditures and controls for each major 
information asset should not be the same. After identifying the major type of information assets 
and their relative worth to the organization, a decision about acceptable risk levels for each 
information asset should be made and senior management is in the best position to make this 
decision (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002).  
 
The assumption that organizations have clear-cut, stable organizational goals is likely inaccurate 
for many organizations (Lederer & Sethi, 1992; Premkumar & King, 1994). Research has shown 
that the organizational goals are established through a dynamic, politically-charged process that 
results in temporary stability (King & Kraemer, 1984). Through active participation in the 
Evaluating Perceived Impact of Collaborative Exchange and Formalization on Info Security R. Young 
 
© International Information Management Association, Inc, 2010 21 ISSN:  1543-5962-Printed Copy       ISSN:  1941-6679-On-line Copy 
business planning process, the information security executive acquires a more enterprise-level 
view of the organization and has less trouble understanding top management’s objectives and 
strategic decisions allowing them to develop more useful relevant information security plans 
(Lederer & Mendelow, 1987). Information security plans not linked to organizational goals and 
strategy are viewed as lacking relevance leading to poor utilization of resources and 
implementation problems which impact the effectiveness of the information security function 
(Sabherwal, 1999). As such, organizations with strong collaborative exchange behaviors between 
upper-level management and information security function are expected to manage information 
security more effectively.  
 
The users have been consistently viewed as the weak link in the information security literature 
(Schultz et al., 2001; Wade, 2004). Leaving them out of the planning process has the potential to 
alienate the information users which could lead to conflict during plan implementation and 
lasting discord between the users and the information security department (Brancheau et al., 
1989). An environment of discord is certainly at odds with the ideals of a collaborative, 
knowledge-sharing organization. While traditional information security evaluation methods are 
heavily focused on quantitative costs and benefits and ignore qualitative issues (Bodin et al., 
2005), newer information security standards (published by the Government Accountability 
Office & National Institute of Standards & Technology) are pushing for more use of qualitative 
information to make information security decisions. High quality information is critical in 
evaluation methods that evaluate qualitative information (Blakley et al., 1991) and the 
knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, and risk that make up the organization’s environment are 
not exclusively or conclusively known at the executive level (James, 1996; Pattinson & 
Anderson, 2007). Ultimately it is the users who must abide by and use the prescriptions that 
make up the finalized information security plan. As such, an organization that nurtures and 
encourages collaborative exchange between management, end users and the information security 
function is theorized to manage information security is a more effective manner.  
 
The literature identifies a number of benefits gained through better communication and 
collaboration which include improved top management commitment (Teo & Ang, 2001), higher 
visibility of the information security function (Chi et al., 2005), more aligned business and 
security plans (Byrd et al., 1995; Lederer & Sethi, 1992), fewer implementation problems 
(Premkumar & King, 1994), better utilization of resources (Sabherwal, 1999), and higher user 
acceptance (James, 1996; Pattinson & Anderson, 2007). This leads to the first set of hypotheses 
below. 
  
Ha1a: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information 
security detection measures. 
 
Ha1b: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information 
security deterrence measures. 
 
Ha1c: Collaborative exchange will positively impact the effectiveness of information 
security recovery measures. 
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Formalization or standardization is the presence of written rules, policies, and procedures that 
drive the behavior of people within an organization. Previous research has examined the 
formalization or standardization of organizational functions using such measures as the number 
of written rule, policies and procedures in place and the extent to which these written documents 
are used (Zmud, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Formalization has been shown in previous 
research to increase user’s perception in regards to the importance of performing the respective 
tasks (Jansen et al, 2006; Zmud, 1982). The last three hypotheses are described below. 
 
Ha2a: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with 
higher levels of effectiveness of information security detection measures. 
 
Ha2b: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with 
higher levels of effectiveness of information security deterrence measures. 
 
Ha2c: More formalized information security programs are positively associated with 
higher levels of effectiveness of information security recovery measures. 
 
METHOD 
Figure 1 shows the full research model which encompasses five constructs of interest: 
collaborative exchange, formalization, information security detection strategies, information 
security deterrence strategies and information security recovery strategies. The difficulty with 
measuring cost and benefits of information systems is well documented (Brynjolfsson, 1993). 
Researchers have more success measuring outcomes measures of success with perceptual 
measures (i.e., improved communication between managers and users) in contrast to objective 
measures (i.e. number of security incidents) (Galletta & Lederer, 1989; Premkumar & King, 
1994). The use of perceptual measures is also encouraged by Kotulic and Clark (2004) who find 
research within the information security domain to be challenging and advise against including 
survey questions asking the respondents to answer sensitive questions (i.e., dollar losses due to 
security violations or number of security violations) or require the respondent to look up 
information. 
 
To measure the extent of collaborative exchange in information security planning the respondent 
is asked to indicate the frequency (range of seldom to almost always) of management, user, and 
information security manager’s participation in information security planning processes. In 
addition to gathering data on the collaborative exchange within organizations, the survey 
instrument also assessed the types and number of information security policies in existence 
within an organization. The National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 
800-53 discuss the various types of information security policies. The survey respondents are 
asked to report yes or no to questions about specific information security policies in use within 
their respective organization as well answer survey items (range strongly disagree to strongly 
agree) that address compliance with legal/regulatory requirements and the extent to which the 
information security function follows documented policies for reporting security violations.  
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Figure 1:  Theoretical Model. 
 
 
 
Three information security strategies at the organization level are examined using a 5-point likert 
scale with 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly agree. The recovery 
measures assess the response capabilities of the information security function and the overall 
organization to information security incidents. The deterrence measures assess the organization’s 
ability to motivate employees to follow information security policies (Straub & Welke, 1998). 
Detection measures are designed to assess how the organization identifies incidents of security 
violations and perpetrators of these violations.  
 
The data was collected by means of a mail survey sent to information security managers, IT 
managers and high-level executives within an organization. Because the unit of analysis for this 
study is at the organizational level, a good overall understanding of the information security 
function within the organization is necessary. In order to measure effectiveness at the 
organizational level, Seddon et al. (1999) state that top-level management and owners are 
acceptable query respondents. As a result, the ideal survey respondent is the top-level manager 
responsible for information security and information systems within an organization. Due to 
discrepancies in job titles and job differentiation, the survey may not be sent to the appropriate 
survey candidate. In an attempt to get data from the ideal candidate, the cover letter will ask the 
individual to forward the survey to the top-level manager directly responsible for the information 
security function of the organization. Contact information for potential respondents was acquired 
from Definitive Database, Inc. which has access to subscriber list of many of the information 
security and IT trade publications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
Collaborative 
Exchange 
Formalization 
Detection 
Deterrence 
Recovery 
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The research design for this study utilizes the survey methodology to assess the relationship 
between collaborative exchange, formalization of information security activities and effective 
utilization of information security strategies. The survey instrument was mailed to 1,500 upper-
level information security and IT executives requesting their participation. Three months 
following the initial mailing, a postcard was sent to potential respondents asking them to 
complete the survey, if they had not already, and return it and also directed the respondent to an 
on-line version of the survey instrument. A total of 119 useable responses were received 
resulting in an effective response rate of 12%. To assess the differences between late and early 
respondents, a t-test of independent samples was conducted on three separate demographic 
responses showing no significant differences between early and late respondents. A profile of the 
responding organizations is shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  
Table 1:  Distribution of respondents by type of organization. 
 
  
Number of 
responses % 
Cumulative 
% 
Public 16 13.5 13.5 
Private 54 45.4 58.9 
Federal 5 4.2 63.1 
State 7 5.9 69.0 
County 6 5.0 74.0 
Municipal 6 5.0 79.0 
Educational 14 11.8 90.8 
Religious 1 0.8 91.6 
Charitable foundation 1 0.8 92.4 
Other 9 7.6 100.0 
Total 119     
 
Table 2:  Distribution of respondents by industry. 
 
  
Number of 
responses % 
Cumulative 
% 
Construction 2 1.7 1.7 
Printing, Publishing 2 1.7 3.4 
Transportation 2 1.7 5.1 
Consumer Goods Manufacturing 3 2.5 7.6 
Capital Goods Manufacturing 2 1.7 9.3 
Utilities 1 0.8 10.1 
Retail 6 5.0 15.1 
Food Service 1 0.8 15.9 
Banking, Sec, Invest 12 10.1 26.0 
Insurance 4 3.4 29.4 
Business Services 7 5.9 35.3 
Entertainment 1 0.8 36.1 
Health 20 16.8 52.9 
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Number of 
responses % 
Cumulative 
% 
Legal 1 0.8 53.7 
Education 14 11.8 65.5 
Government 20 16.8 82.3 
Military 2 1.7 84.0 
    
Other  19 16.0 100.0 
Total 119     
 
Table 3:  Distribution of respondents by organization size. 
 
  Number of responses % Cumulative % 
Less than 500 34 28.6 28.6 
500 to less than 1,500 29 24.4 52.9 
1,500 to less than 5,000 31 26.1 79.1 
5,000 to less than 10,000 9 7.6 86.6 
10,000 to less than 50,000 8 6.7 93.3 
50,000 or more 8 6.7 100 
Total 119     
  
Table 4 shows the percentage of participating organizations using specific information security 
policies. Access control policy and procedures is the most prevalent information security policy 
in use which is understandable as the early beginnings of information security dealt specifically 
with granting access and separation of duties (Von Solms, 2000). The least used type of 
information security policy is certification, accreditation and security assessment policy and 
procedures. Table 5 shows the mean statistics for the line items measuring effective utilization of 
detection, deterrence, and recovery strategies. All measures show a greater than neutral response 
except for the line item measuring user training in respect to information security policies. This 
hints that despite the emphasis placed on user training in information security standards and 
publications, user training is still a weak point in the information security domain.  
Table 4:  Distribution of information security policy use.  
 
  Policy Used % 
Access Control Policy and Procedures 114 95.8 
Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures 96 80.7 
Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures 93 78.2 
Certification, Accreditation & Security Assessment Policy and 
Procedures 48 40.3 
Configuration Management Policy and Procedures 89 74.8 
Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures 97 81.5 
Identification & Authentication Policy and Procedures 104 87.4 
Incident Response Policy and Procedures 86 72.3 
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System Maintenance Policy and Procedures 94 79.0 
Media Protection Policy and Procedures 92 77.3 
Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures 102 85.7 
Security Planning Policy and Procedures 81 68.1 
Personnel Security Policy and Procedures 89 74.8 
Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures 80 67.2 
System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures 72 60.5 
System and Communication Protection Policy and Procedures 85 71.4 
Systems and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures 82 68.9 
 
Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics for information security effectiveness. 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
 
In the event of an information security 
violation, the organization has little 
problem identifying the perpetrator 
 3.62 0.92 
Users caught violating information security 
policies are disciplined 
 3.60 1.02 
The information security department 
discovers attacks on the network as they 
happen 
 3.51 0.97 
Users comply with information security 
controls 
 3.42 0.90 
Appropriate employees have a good 
understanding of the organization’s disaster 
recovery plans 
 3.40 1.06 
Users understand the consequences for 
failure to follow information security 
policies 
 3.38 1.02 
Appropriate employees have a good 
understanding of the organization’s 
contingency plans 
 3.31 1.04 
In the event of an information security 
violation, the organization has little 
problem identifying how the perpetrator 
gained access 
 3.28 0.90 
Appropriate employees have a good 
understanding of the organization’s 
continuity plans 
 3.22 1.08 
Users are sufficiently trained with respect 
to information security policies 
 2.95 1.06 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Exploratory factor analysis is one common approach utilized to assess the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the measurement instruments. Factor analysis is used to assess the 
dimensionality of survey items which is an assessment of whether multiple items on a 
measurement instrument measure a single or multidimensional construct. It accomplishes this 
feat by analyzing the correlations among the various items in the measurement instrument to 
identify unique factors (Hair et al., 1998).  
 
Sufficient correlations in the data matrix are required for successful application of factor analysis 
(Hair et al., 1998). Two measures used to assess the appropriateness of the data matrix for factor 
analysis are the Bartlett test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy. The Bartlett test for sphericity assesses the statistical probability of significant 
correlations among some of the variables (Hair et al., 1998). A significance level less than 0.05 
demonstrates acceptable correlations among some of the variables. The measurement instrument 
show a Bartlett test for sphericity significance level less than 0.01. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy measures the degree of intercorrelations among the variables 
(Hair et al., 1998). A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.6 or above is 
acceptable. The performance measurement instruments show Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy of .799.  
 
Factor analysis was conducted with the criterion of Eigenvalues greater than 1 in order to 
determine the optimum number of factors. The factor loadings are examined to assess the degree 
of correlation between the individual variables and the proposed factor structure. Items with a 
factor loading greater than 0.6 are deemed to be significantly correlated with the proposed factor 
structure (Hair et al., 1998). While items with factor loading of .3 or more on more than one 
factor are deemed to be cross-loading across factors and are not unique indicators of a single 
factor (Hair et al., 1998). Table 6 shows the factor loadings for the performance construct.  
 
After factor analysis, the Cronbach’s alpha of each factor is calculated in order to assess 
reliability. Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of the items in the factor. The 
lower limit for an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7 (Hair et al., 1998). The Cronbach’s alpha 
calculations are also shown in Table 6. The total variance explained for the three remaining 
dependent variables is 73.06%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Factor Analysis Results. 
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  Recovery Deterrence Detection 
Discover attacks 0.019 0.207 0.695 
Identify Perpetrator 0.150 0.009 0.761 
How Perp accessed 0.159 0.205 0.831 
Understand 
Consequences 
0.183 0.828 0.156 
User Comply 0.158 0.848 0.066 
Users Disciplined 0.272 0.657 0.249 
User Train 0.192 0.734 0.113 
Understand Disaster 
Recovery Plans 
0.863 0.227 0.149 
Understand 
Contingency Plans 
0.921 0.235 0.137 
Understand Continuity 
Plans 
0.913 0.242 0.101 
Variance explained 26.44 26.25 19.06 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.933 0.822 0.692 
 
In addition to factor analysis, the square root of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each 
construct was calculated. AVE is a measure of the percentage of variance that is described by the 
construct of interest. A comparison of the square root AVE and the correlations of the latent 
constructs shows proof of discriminant validity (Gefen & Straub, 1997). For proof of 
discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE must be larger than the correlations. The square 
root of the AVE for each construct is larger than the respective correlations.  
 
Next is an examination of correlations between the control variables of organization type, size 
and percent of budget spent on information security.  A crosstab and chi-square test of 
independence between the variables organization size and percentage of budget spent on security 
(See Table 7) shows no relationship exist between these two control variables. In addition, no 
relationship is found between organization type and the percentage of budget spent on security 
(See Table 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Test of Independence (size versus % of budget spent on security). 
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Cross-tabulation Table 
OBSERVED 
 
% of IT budget spent on IT 
security 
Size <3% 3% - 7% >7% Total 
less than 1,500 9 23 29 61 
1,500 to less than 10,000 12 18 11 41 
10,000 or more 5 7 5 17 
Total 26 48 45 119 
Calculation of the Chi-Square 
Test 
DESCRIPTION VALUE 
  
2* 5.827819 
p-value 0.212381 
Critical value 9.487729 
α 0.05 
df 4 
  
 
 Table 8:  Test of Independence (org. type versus % of budget spent on security). 
 
Cross-tabulation Table 
OBSERVED 
 
% of IT budget spent on IT 
security 
Organization Type <3% >3% Total 
For-Profit 26 43 69 
Government 11 12 23 
Non-Profit 13 10 23 
Total 50 65 115 
Calculation of the Chi-Square Test 
DESCRIPTION VALUE 
  
2* 2.712821 
p-value 0.257584 
Critical value 5.991465 
α 0.05 
df 2 
 
Prior to Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, regression analysis is performed by regressing 
number of information security policies, size of organization and percent of security budget on 
information security effectiveness measures of recovery, detection and deterrence. Tables 9, 10, 
and 11 show the regression results for number of information security policies and the three 
effectiveness measures of recovery, detection, and deterrence. All three regression results show a 
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significant positive relationship between the number of information security policies and the 
effectiveness of information security measures. An interesting result is seen in regression 
analysis as percent of budget spent on information security appears to have a significant 
correlation with recovery measure while it is not significant with detection and deterrence 
measures. This finding may be due to the observation that deterrence and detection controls are 
more budget driven and cost are easier to estimate. Meanwhile the expenses of recovery controls 
are more difficult to estimate and tend to be tied to the number and degree of information 
security incidents that occur. The organization’s ability to effectively recover from security 
incidents is dependent on having the available resources when needed. Organizations with spend 
a higher percentage of the budget on information security may have more slack designed for 
dealing with security incidents as they occur.  
 
Table 9:  Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Recovery Measures. 
 
Variables β t-value p-value 
Number of Information Security Policies 0.291 3.180     0.002 *** 
Size of Organization -0.069 -0.867 0.389 
% of Budget Spent on Information 
Security  0.213 3.208      0.002 *** 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 10:  Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Detection Measures. 
 
Variables β t-value p-value 
Number of Information Security Policies 0.205 2.899     0.005 *** 
Size of Organization 0.002 0.029 0.977 
% of Budget Spent on Information 
Security  0.075 1.473 0.145 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11:  Information Security Policies and Effectiveness of Deterrence Measures. 
 
Variables β t-value p-value 
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Number of Information Security Policies 0.358 4.941     0.000 *** 
Size of Organization 0.052 0.821 0.414 
% of IT Budget Spent on Information 
Security  0.063 1.194 0.236 
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
 
PLS Analysis  
 
This section describes the statistical analysis of the proposed research model and its associated 
hypothesis using the PLS causal modeling approach. PLS has several advantages over traditional 
statistical techniques like regression and analysis of variance. PLS has the capability to 
concurrently test the measurement and structural model and is not constrained to data sets that 
meet homogeneity and normality requirements (Chin et al., 2003). SmartPLS version 2.0 
(Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) is used to analyze the measurement model and the structural path 
between the constructs of interest. In order to obtain reliable results and t-values, 200 random 
samples of 100 are generated using a bootstrapping procedure. The hypotheses will be evaluated 
by assessing the sign and significance of the structural path coefficient using one-tailed t-test 
statistics. PLS Graph does not calculate any goodness-of-fit values, so the coefficient of 
determination is evaluated to assess the predictive validity of the research model. Figure 2 shows 
the path coefficients of the PLS model. Table 12 shows the t-values of the PLS model and the 
results of hypothesis testing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Results of PLS Analysis. 
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Table 12:   Summary of Hypothesis Tests.  
 
Hypothesis Results t-value 
Ha1a: Collaborative exchange will positively impact 
the effectiveness of information security detection 
measures. 
Supported 2.36* 
Ha1b: Collaborative exchange will positively impact 
the effectiveness of information security deterrence 
measures. 
Supported 4.92** 
Ha1c: Collaborative exchange will positively impact 
the effectiveness of information security recovery 
measures. 
Supported 3.11** 
Ha2a: More formalized information security programs 
are positively associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security detection 
measures. 
Supported 4.44** 
Ha2b: More formalized information security programs 
are positively associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security deterrence 
measures. 
Supported 6.52** 
Ha2c: More formalized information security programs 
are positively associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security recovery 
Supported 3.30** 
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measures. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01  
 
Hypothesis 1a-c proposes that organizations that exhibit higher levels of collaborative exchange 
when addressing information-security-related concerns and plans will more effectively utilize the 
information security strategies of detection, deterrence and recovery. The results of hypothesis 
testing show a positive correlation exist between collaborative exchange and the effectiveness 
utilization of detection, deterrence and recovery strategies. This result shows the effectiveness of 
information security within the organization is impacted by the extent of collaborative exchange 
within the organization.  This helps to support past research findings of user and management 
involvement significantly impacting the performance of specific functions within an organization 
(Gottschalk, 1999; Sambamurthy et al., 1994; Segars & Grover, 1998) and information security 
is no exception.  
 
Hypothesis 2a-c proposes that organizations that expend more effort in developing and utilizing 
information security policies will more effectively utilize the information security strategies of 
detection, deterrence and recovery. The results of hypothesis testing show a significant positive 
correlation between extent of information security policy use and the three information security 
strategies. This finding highlights the value-added associated with establishing specific 
information security policies within the organization. 
  
To test the predictive power of the PLS model, the explained variance (R2) is examined for the 
models of collaborative exchange and formalization on each endogenous construct individually 
to the full model (Chin, 1998). The PLS models with collaborative exchange and the three 
constructs of detection, deterrence and recovery explained 13.5%, 28.7% and 20.2% of the 
variance respectively. The PLS models with formalization and the three constructs of detection, 
deterrence and recovery explained 22.4%, 36.2% and 21% of the variance respectively. While 
the PLS model with both collaborative exchange and formalization explained 26.6%, 46.8% and 
29.8% of the variance. This increase in explained variance is significant suggesting that the 
complement of collaborative exchange and formalization together is crucial for effective 
utilization of detection, deterrence and recovery strategies. 
    
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The results of data analysis shows that the degree of formalization of the information security 
function is correlated with effective utilization of recovery, deterrence, and detection strategies 
which suggests that organizations are better off creating specific policies to address specific 
information security concerns within the organization as this may increase user awareness and 
promote more consistent organizational behavior. However, this study also highlights the 
importance of developing information security policies while fostering collaborative exchange 
between the organization’s information security function, management and end users of 
information systems. These results suggest two potential benefits to an organization. First, 
collaboration between the information security function, management and the end-user, in 
regards to information security initiatives, may lead to the development of policies that are 
deemed more relevant to existing threats thereby improving the quality of the formalized 
policies. Improvements in the quality of the information security policies may lead to better 
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utilization of the available information security strategies to combat existing organizational 
threats.  
 
Second, end-user involvement in the information security policy development process may lead 
to higher acceptance and ownership thereby improving the effectiveness of the information 
security policies and the detection, deterrence and recovery strategies that the policies address. In 
the end, it is the user who must adhere to the finalized information security policies and attempts 
to foster collaborative exchange within the organization may advance the user buy-in process. 
This study shows the importance of the complementary impact of collaborative exchange and 
formalization on the effectiveness of the information security function and discredits the notion 
that information security policies is best developed by the information security function and/or 
upper-level management and then circulated to the end user for compliance. The danger inherent 
is leaving the decision-making involved in the policy development process to the information 
security function or management alone may lead to user resistance and less compliance. 
Fostering an environment of free exchange of ideas within the organization with regards to 
information security initiatives offers the user a glimpse into the threats facing the organization 
thereby increasing the perceived importance of implementing and complying with information 
security policies. 
 
There are several limitations inherent in this study. First limitation is common method variance 
as information from one respondent within each organization was gathered. Another limitation is 
this study’s cross sectional design only permits claims of correlation not causation. One last 
limitation is desirability bias reporting. Social desirability bias is present when respondents 
overrate positive survey questions and underrate negative survey questions. As the survey 
instrument was sent to respondents with information security responsibility within their 
respective organizations, this bias may be present.  
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